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This Reply Brief is a combined response to both the Brief 
of the Corporate Appellees (filed by John L. Valentine and 
Phillip E. Lowry) and the mislabeled and erroneously filed 
Brief of the Individual "Appellants" (actually Appellees) 
filed by Thomas W. Seiler. 
Prior to presentation of this Brief, we ask the Utah Court 
of Appeals to consider that due to our circumstances 
resulting from the events in this case, we are presenting 
this case on a Pro Se basis, and cite: 
Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d at 268, 372 P.2d at 991: At 
the same time, we have also cautioned that "because of his 
lack of technical knowledge of law and procedure [a layman 
acting as his own attorney] should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged." 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On November 25, 1997 Plaintiffs and Appellants, Chris & 
Laurie Swanson (Hereinafter: Chris & Laurie) filed a 
Notice of Appeal in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit D) which states it is an Appeal from 
the Final Order and Judgments of the Honorable Anthony 
Schofield, entered in this matter on November 10, 1997. 
It further states that "The Appeal is taken from the 
entire Order and Judgments". This November 10th (filed 
November 11th) Final Order was a final entry of the 
October 10, 1997 Ruling (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit C) by the 
Honorable Judge Schofield, which granted both the 
Individual and Corporate Defendants' Motion under Rule 54 
1 
(b), certifying: A) The Individual Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment entered in their favor on or 
about December 10, 1996; and B) the Corporate Defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment entered in their favor 
on or about May 13, 1997, as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
This Ruling of October 10, 1997, also denied Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Set Aside these Judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibits S,T). We also cite: 
White v. Cassev, (W.D. Oklahoma) D.C. No. CIV-92-797-A. in 
pertinent part: "... "Since this appeal encompasses not 
only the Rule 60(b) issue but also the judgment on the 
merits, see Bud Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges 
Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1439-40 and n. 3 and cases 
cited therein (10th Cir. 1990)(while appeal solely from 
denial of Rule 60(b) motion was limited to consideration 
thereof and did not call up merits of prior, underlying 
judgment, if timely appeal had been taken from both 
rulings, resultant review would have extended to merits of 
judgment as well as denial of Rule 60(b) relief), we 
retain jurisdiction over the appeal from the judgment on 
the merits during pendency of the Rule 60(b) motion with 
the district court on remand. See Browder v. Director, 
Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n. 7, 54 L. Ed. 2d 
521, 98 S. Ct. 556 (1978) (Rule 60(b) motion does not 
affect finality of original judgment and district court 
retains its power to decide motion after appeal from 
latter is taken). Should the district court deny the Rule 
60(b) motion, we shall proceed with the appeal on the 
merits; should the district court instead certify its 
intention to grant the motion, we shall remand the entire 
case for the district court's disposition of the motion 
and consequent de novo consideration of the merits. See 
Garcia v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 737 F.2d 889, 890 
(10th Cir. 1984) (to ensure survival of existing appeal 
from judgment on merits, appellate court should retain 
jurisdiction while Rule 60(b) motion to vacate judgment 
appealed from is pending with district court and remand 
case only in event district court certifies its intent to 
grant motion). Cf. United States v. Draper, 746 F.2d 662, 
664-66 (10th Cir. 1984)(discussing same procedure in 
context of motion for new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 
33). 
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HISTORY POINT I 
This Appeal was accepted by the Supreme Court of Utah, and 
the Plaintiffs' and Appellants' Docketing Statement (PRO 
SE) was filed with the Supreme Court of Utah on or about 
January 27, 1998. This Docketing Statement indicates in 
part, that we (Chris & Laurie) are appealing the Summary 
Judgment of May 10, 1997, and the Ruling of October 10, 
1997 (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit C) by Judge Anthony Schofield, 
in response to Plaintiffs' Rule 60 (b) Motion 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit T). Although the Docketing 
Statement (PRO SE) erred in that it did not clearly state 
that this was an Appeal of the November 11th Final Ruling, 
this was not a fatal error, and it was clear to all 
parties that the intent was to appeal all issues addressed 
in the October 10, 1997 Ruling of Judge Schofield, The 
Individual Defendants and Appellees have recently cited in 
their Response to Appellants' Motion to Strike and Motion 
for Partial Summary Disposition (Exhibit 2-A) , mailed 
October 13, 1998, page 3: "(5 Am Jur 2d Appellate Review 
Sections 578, Page 281)", which addresses briefing errors 
and in pertinent part states that ".•.courts may reach the 
merits of the case in the interest of justice or simply as 
a matter of discretion...Courts prefer to dispose of a 
case on the merits... Courts are least likely to 
dismiss...when briefing errors do not hamper the ability 
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to dispose of the appeal or otherwise interfere with their 
review...when the defects do not prejudice the other 
party." On or about February 9, 1998, Mr. Seiler filed a 
Motion with The Utah Supreme Court for Summary Disposition 
(Exhibit 2-B) on the basis that the grounds for review are 
"so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings and 
consideration by this Court". Mr. Seiler generally 
attacks our 60 (b) arguments, and notes on page 4 in 
pertinent part: "However, to the extent that the 
Plaintiffs' statement is technically deficient, but 
excusable, the individual Defendants rely on the foregoing 
(60 (b) arguments as their) basis for granting their 
Motion for Summary Disposition". No claim of lack of 
jurisdiction based upon this harmless error was made by 
the Individual Defendants at that time; Mr. Seller's 
Motion was denied. 
POINT 11 
Numerous Motions, Orders, and Responses were filed with 
the Utah Supreme Court in the interim, and subsequently on 
May 28, 1998, the case was poured-over to The Utah State 
Court of Appeals (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit E ) . 
PC1.1 NT i"! I 
On June 19, 1998, The Utah Court of Appeals filed a Sua 
Sponte Motion for lack of jurisdiction (Exhibit 2-C) and 
ordered both parties to file a Memorandum, not to exceed 
4 
ten pages, explaining why Summary Disposition should, or 
should not, be granted by the Court. It was further 
ordered that the Memorandum should be filed with the Clerk 
of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before July 3 , 1998. 
Plaintiffs filed said Memorandum (Exhibit 2-D), outlining 
in five pages the reasons the Sua Sponte Motion should not 
be granted, and also filed the ordered Memorandum in a 
timely manner. However, the Corporate Defendants mailed 
their Memorandum Supporting Sua Sponte Motion (Exhibit 2-
E) untimely on July 6, 1998. They made no arguments 
regarding jurisdiction or the Docketing Statement, but 
simply stated "The Motion should be granted". The 
Individual Defendants also mailed their Memorandum 
Supporting Sue Sponte Motion (Exhibit 2-F) untimely on 
July 7, 1998, and they also made no arguments regarding 
jurisdiction, nor offered any reason including any minor 
technical errors in the Docketing Statement, beyond "The 
Motion should be granted". 
POINT IV 
On July 13, 1998, the Honorable Judge Greenwood issued an 
Order, (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit F) based upon a review of the 
entire Trial Court Record and determined in pertinent 
part: ". . . . the Notice of Appeal was filed within 
thirty days after entry of a November 11, 1998 (actually 
1997) Order memorializing the Trial Court's Ruling and 
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certifying the Judgments as final for purposes of Appeal 
under Rule 54(b). . . " ; furthermore, "the Sua Sponte 
Motion for Summary Disposition (was) withdrawn", and the 
Appellants were ordered to file their Brief on or before 
August 24, 1998, which we did. 
CONCLUSION REGARDING JURISDICTION 
Now, at this late date, it is the Individual and Corporate 
Defendants who are attempting to make an end-run around 
this Courts' decision regarding jurisdiction and the 
issues to be argued, in order to avoid the more fair and 
liberal standard of review regarding appeal of Summary 
Judgments, and Chris & Laurie Swansons ' compelling 
arguments that these Judgments should be reversed. This 
Court has already determined and accepted jurisdiction 
over these Judgments that were only appealable upon 
certification of the 54 (b) Rulings, Chris & Laurie's 
Appeal is timely, and the Standard of Review by The Utah 
Court of Appeals should be that generally accorded a Grant 
of Summary Judgment by a District Court, as outlined in 
our original Brief. Furthermore, the evidence before this 
Court shows that the 60 (b) Ruling was clearly an abuse of 
discretion by the Trial Court. 
REPLY TO THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS BY THE 
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 
The Plaintiffs have argued and will address the 
6 
Defendants' arguments to the contrary that Mark K. 
Stringer abandoned his fiduciary duty, ceased to act as 
our agent, exhibited positive misconduct, gross negligence 
and egregious unprofessional behavior. We have argued and 
proven that we executed all reasonable care and due 
diligence in forwarding our case. It must be noted that 
the Statement of the Case and Facts presented by the 
Individual and Corporate Defendants are the facts stated 
bv the Defendants, for the Defendants, and of the 
Defendants. Chris & Laurie never had the opportunity to 
rebut these facts, and if given the opportunity, can prove 
that these Defendants' "Facts" are patently false. 
Footnote (1) pg. vii of the Corporate Defendants' Brief 
erroneously states in part: "(1) there are simply no other 
facts in the record". This is not true, the facts as 
presented in our original Complaint (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit 
K) , Plaintiffs' Response to the Individual Defendants' 
Counterclaim (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit N) , Mr. Stringer's 
Affidavit (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit W) , and our Affidavit of 
July 15, 1998 (Pi.Orig.Br. Exhibit X), all of which were 
before the District Court, are more than sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact. In reply to 
Footnote (2) pg. vii of Corp. Def. Br., as outlined above 
under Jurisdiction, this Appeal is from Summary Judgments 
that were entered as final under Rule 54, and therefore, 
7 
is to be construed in a light most favorable to Chris & 
Laurie Swanson. 
REPLY TO THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Corporate Defendants have also misrepresented the 
facts in their Response Brief, (Point II, page x) 
regarding the "Course of Proceedings Below": 
It is true that Chris & Laurie Swanson filed the original 
Complaint on or about May 10, 1996. However, the blanket 
statement that nothing of substance happened in the file 
until November 5, 1996, is untrue: 
a) June 12, 1996: Corporate Defendant filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim to the Plaintiffs' suit (Plf.Orig.Br. 
Exhibit L). 
b) July 9, 1996: Individual Defendants filed a 
Counterclaim (Plf.Orig.Br• Exhibit M) to the 
Plaintiffs' original Complaint. 
c) July 17, 1996: Individual Defendants separately 
responded to Plaintiffs Interrogatories, Requests for 
Admissions and Production of Documents (Plf.Orig.Br. 
Exhibit AA). 
d) July 17, 1996: Plaintiffs' attorney Stringer filed a 
Response to the Individual Defendant's Counterclaim 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit N) , which presents both an 
answer and meritorious defense. Note that the Trial 
Court on page 4/footnote 2 of it's October 10, 1997 
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Ruling (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit C) erroneously states 
that "plaintiffs have taken no action at all with 
respect to this action" since filing "discovery 
requests in May 1996". This is a substantial error by 
the Trial Court. 
e) July 17, 1996: Individual Defendants' Certificate of 
Delivery of Answers to Discovery Requests 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit AA) and Acceptance of Discovery 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit Z) were signed; however, these 
were not filed with the Trial Court until December 31, 
1996, after the Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
f) August 16, 1996: Corporate Defendant writes 
Plaintiffs' attorney Stringer admitting that he had 
sent a copy of Discovery Requests previously to the 
officers of the Corporation, but "I have not had a 
response on them" (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit 0). 
g) August 26, 1996: Corporate Defendant finally files 
Certificate of Delivery of Discovery in Response to 
Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Admissions 
(Exhibit 2-G). 
h) November 6, 1997: Individual Defendants file Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment (Exhibit 2-H). 
i) November 7, 1996: Letter from Corporate Defendant's 
attorney Valentine sends delayed Answers to 
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Interrogatories and Reply to Request for Production of 
Documents (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit P) , and Stipulation 
(Plf .Orig.Br. Exhibit Q) . It is important to note 
that these Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
of Documents had been served May 15, 1997. A delay of 
almost six months was caused bv the Corporate 
Defendant. 
j) November 19, 1996: Individual Defendants claim to hand 
deliver Attorney Mark Stringer a Notice of Submission 
for Decision re: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(Exhibit 2-1). 
k) December 10, 1996: Partial Summary Judgment signed by 
District Court Judge Hansen on December 6, 19 96, was 
filed (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit A ) . The attached 
Certificate of Hand Delivery (page 3) indicates it was 
hand delivered on November 19, 1996. 
1) On or about February 11, 1997: Corporate Defendant 
filed it's Motion for Summary Judgment (Exhibit 2-J). 
m) May 13, 1997: Corporate Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was granted (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit B) . 
n) On or about June 8, 1997: Upon personally confronting 
Mr. Stringer, he finally admitted to us that a Summary 
Judgment had been entered in favor of the Corporate 
Defendant, although he claimed not to have a copy and 
promised to secure and mail it immediately. He 
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assured us that he would file a 60 (b) Motion and 
explained it as "just a formality." He did not advise 
us of the December 10, 1996 Partial Summary Judgment 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit A), and assured us that the Lis 
Pendens (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit BB) was still in place. 
We immediately began attempts to obtain other counsel. 
o) June 26, 1997: Laurie Swanson returned to Utah and 
inquired at the District Court regarding the status of 
our case (after five days of being unable to meet, 
locate or even speak with Mr. Stringer), finding that 
Mr. Stringer had not filed any 60 (b) Motion as 
promised, and also discovering the Summary Judgment in 
favor of the Individual Defendants. Immediately upon 
discovery of this status of our case, and the gross 
negligence, positive misconduct, and mis-
representations of Mr. Stringer, we terminated him 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit R) and retained Mr. Schollian. 
The above summary clearly shows that both the Trial 
Court's findings and the arguments of the Defendants err 
in stating that we had done nothing to forward our case 
and/or nothing of substance happened during the time the 
case was filed by the Plaintiffs until November 5, 1996. 
It was the Corporate Defendant who failed to respond to 
the Plaintiffs1 Request for Interrogatories and caused &n 
almost six month delay in the proceedings. Mr. Valentine 
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admits in his August 1996 letter (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit O) , 
that his client, Swanson Enterprises, Inc., had failed to 
respond to the Request for Interrogatories and Production 
of Documents, yet he allowed an additional delay until 
November 7, 1996, before providing the required Responses 
(Plf .Orig.Br. Exhibit P) . It is clear that Mr. Stringer 
should have defaulted the Defendants based upon their lack 
of response, and that sometime in or around August of 
1996, it is now obvious that he completely abandoned any 
duty of care, agency agreement, fiduciary responsibility, 
and for whatever reason(s) began a course of positive 
misconduct, lies, and egregious behavior, that not only 
dissolved the attorney-client relationship with Chris and 
Laurie Swanson, but resulted in, or contributed to, his 
suspension from the Utah State Bar (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit 
U) and his filing of Bankruptcy (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit V) . 
This was not a simple matter of lack of support staff, 
disorganization, busy schedules, etc., but a pattern of 
personal, legal, financial, and perhaps mental problems 
that resulted in a downward spiral that not only destroyed 
Mr. Stringer, but his clients. This is a perfect example 
of the exceptional, extraordinary, and unusual 
circumstances that Rule 60 (b) is intended to redress. 
Stringer's actions resulted in a substantial injustice to 
Chris and Laurie Swanson and a substantial windfall to the 
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Defendants and Appellees. 
REPLY TO THE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The facts before the Trial Court, including Mark 
Stringer's Sworn Affidavit (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit W) and 
Chris & Laurie Swanson's Sworn Affidavit (Plf.Orig.Br. 
Exhibit X) were compelling. Attorney Stringer admitted 
that he was unaware of the Judgment until late May 1997. 
Mr. Stringer admitted he never told us about the 
Judgments, a clear breach of agency. We swore and averred 
that we had been in constant contact with Mr. Stringer and 
his office and he had misrepresented the facts of the 
case. After discovery of his abandonment, we took 
immediate action in terminating him and ensured that a 60 
(b) Motion was filed (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit T) . Every 
action we took was that of any reasonable and responsible 
layperson. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT I 
Regardless if the Trial Court deemed Chris & Laurie 
Swansons* Rule 60 (b) Motion (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit T) as 
(b)l or (b)7, relief was available under either and should 
have been granted. As pointed out above, although Chris & 
Laurie's attorney, Mr. Stringer, had failed to respond to 
the Corporate Counterclaim, the Corporate Defendant had 
delayed almost six months in providing Answers to 
Interrogatories and Requests for Documents that were 
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requested prior to the Corporate Counterclaim. A reading 
of Mr. Stringer's Affidavit (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit W) and 
Chris & Laurie Swansons * Affidavit (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit 
X) shows that we had been diligent in following up with 
Mr. Stringer. There was more than sufficient evidence 
before the Trial Court to grant us relief in the interest 
of justice. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT II 
The District Court erred when it states that Chris & 
Laurie Swanson do not have a Meritorious Defense. We did 
respond to the Individual Defendants' Counterclaim, which 
is essentially the same as the Corporate Counterclaim, on 
July 17, 1996. In this Response (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit N), 
which was part of the evidence before the Court, we 
specifically incorporate all assertions, allegations, and 
other matters outlined in our original Complaint, in (#4): 
"Plaintiffs affirmatively state and allege that at no time 
have they misused their corporate office, misused or 
misappropriated corporate funds or opportunities, or in 
any manner breached their fiduciary duties to the other 
shareholders of the corporation." Furthermore, in our 
July 15, 1997 Affidavit (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit X) we denied 
all allegations by the Defendants and Counterclaimants, in 
(#10) : "We are confident that the findings of this Court, 
entered as a result of Mr. Stringer's failure to respond 
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to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the 
finding of the Court as a result of the Summary Judgment 
entered on May 13, 1997, can be disproved if we are given 
the opportunity to present our own facts and evidence." 
The Honorable Judge Schofield made two clearly erroneous 
findings in his Ruling (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit C) dated 
October 10, 1997. 
First, he states on page 2 of his Ruling that we have not 
made a meritorious defense to the Individual Defendant's 
Counterclaim. This is a clearly erroneous factual 
finding. Our Response to the Individual Defendant's 
Counterclaim (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit N) clearly meets the 
legal definition of Meritorious Defense. We Quote Ericson 
v. Schenkers 1994.UT. 16335 882 P.2d 1147, 250 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 , Utah Supreme Court: 
"A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default 
judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried. . . the 
sole issue is whether, as a matter of law, a defendant's 
proposed Answer contains a defense which is entitled to be 
tried. " Id. at 1059 (Durham, J. , dissenting) ; see also 
Downey State Bank v. Major Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 
510 (Utah 1976) ("One who seeks to vacate a default 
judgment must proffer some defense of at least sufficient 
ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the issue 
thus raised.") 
Here, the Utah Supreme Court held that a general denial is 
sufficient to meet the meritorious defense requirement." 
Chris & Laurie Swanson both in their pleadings and the 
admitted Affidavit have presented a more than sufficient 
meritorious defense. 
Second, regarding excusable neglect: the facts before the 
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Court were clear- Attorney Stringer in his sworn Affidavit 
(Plf .Orig.Br. Exhibit W) stated that he did not tell Chris 
and Laurie Swanson about the Judgments. Also before the 
Court was Mr. Valentine's letter (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit P) 
and Stipulation (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit Q) which shows that 
the Defendants had delayed answers. We refer again to 
Westinahouse v. Larsen, (1975.UT. 198, 544 P.2d 876 
Supreme Court of Utah) which has many similarities to the 
case at bar: 
In pertinent part. . ."It is not to be doubted that in 
order to handle the business of the court with efficiency 
and expedition the trial court should have a reasonable 
latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to 
prosecute. . .if a party fails to move forward according 
to the rules and the directions of the court, without 
justifiable excuse. . . But that prerogative falls 
short of unreasonable and arbitrary action which will 
result in injustice. Whether there is such justifiable 
excuse is to be determined by considering more factors 
than merely the length of time since the suit was filed. 
Some consideration should be given to the conduct of both 
parties, and to the opportunity each has had to move the 
case forward and what they have done about i t . . .and also 
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the 
other side; and most important, whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal. . . Applying those principles 
here, these observations are pertinent: although there was 
unusual delay in getting this case to trial, this was due 
in large part to the unusual circumstances delineated 
above. Further, we are not impressed that the defendants 
themselves were overly diligent or manifest any particular 
haste in getting the pretrial discovery procedures 
completed and on with the trial. They did not do so in 
responsive action to Westinghouse's having assembled 
records, nor to the latter*s messages concerning their 
availability, nor did thev seek any assistance from the 
court. . .It is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in order to 
keep them up to date. But it is even more important to 
keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of 
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard 
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and to do justice between them. In conformity with that 
principle the courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgments where there is any 
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. . .It is our 
conclusion that the trial court failed to give proper 
weight to the higher priority; and that under the 
circumstances described herein, the order of dismissal was 
an abuse of discretion. It is therefore necessary that the 
order be vacated and the case remanded for further 
proceedings." 
Surely, the Defendants should have had some suspicion or 
even possible knowledge of the status of Mr. Stringer's 
practice and problems. The Defendants or the Court could 
have forwarded a copy of the impending default to our home 
address, which was known to all parties, and we would have 
immediately taken action to protect our interests. 
Here, we will briefly address points 5-12 as outlined on 
pages 4, 5 and 6 of The Corporate Defendant's Brief: 
It is undisputed that we had no knowledge that Mr. 
Stringer had failed to reply to the Corporate Counterclaim 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit L) and we had no knowledge of any 
pending Summary Judgment. We could not respond, as Mr. 
Stringer did not make us aware of the necessity to 
respond. Our only Court appearance, the 60(b) Hearing, was 
not a trial, we were not allowed to testify (see 
Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit Y, p.16, lines 21-22), and we are to 
this day perplexed as to the exact reasons Mr. Stringer 
broke his agency agreement with us, failed to prosecute 
our case, misled us and stopped acting as our attorney. 
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There was evidence before the Court that we had taken 
steps to forward our case, including our Affidavit 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit X) and Mr. Stringer's Affidavit 
(Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit W). Regarding the Brief of 
Corporate Appellees, #9, page 5: The statement that we 
were not aware of the motion for Summary Judgment until 
July 27, 1997, made in our Affidavit notarized on July 15, 
1997, was clearly an honest error, not deception. At this 
point, Mr. Valentine and Lowry veer into "mind-reading" as 
related to the Court's reasoning. Let us point out that 
page xi of the Brief of the Corporate Appellant states 
that the Hearing by Judge Schofield was on September 22, 
19 9 7 ; however, the Record shows that the Hearing was 
actually on September 4, 1997 -we do not presume to call 
this misstatement deceptive. Regarding #10, page 5: Mr. 
Stringer admits that he did not inform us of the 
Judgments, we affirm that we were not informed of the 
Judgments, the Defendants never made any attempt to notify 
us directly of any pending or actual Judgments, what more 
evidence is necessary? Regarding #12, page 5: please see 
Westinghouse above as related to our meritorious defense. 
Finally, regarding the three Affidavits filed upon the day 
of the Rule 60 (b) Hearing: The Court and the Defendants 
state that the three Affidavits (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibits 
G,H,I) filed on the day of the Hearing were not used as a 
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basis for the Ruling. However, in his October 10, 1997 
Ruling (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit C), Judge Schofield refers to 
the content of those Affidavits as justification for his 
Ruling (page 4/footnote 2), The Corporate Defendant 
further "opens the door" to a complete review of these 
Affidavits by referring to them on page 13/footnote 6 
Brief of the Corporate Defendant, and confirms that the 
Trial Court relied upon them in it's Ruling; therefore, we 
ask that this Court review them in full, including the 
letter of Beverly Swanson, and make them part of the 
Record of this case. These Affidavits more specifically 
respond to the untrue Affidavits of Defendant Shumway and 
Beverly Swanson and clearly outline our meritorious 
defense and sufficiency of the Summary Judgments. Upon 
review of the file on the morning of the Hearing, we 
insisted upon filing the additional Affidavits. We also 
ask that this Court consider that Mr. Schollian, our 
second attorney, and we, Chris and Laurie Swanson, were at 
a disadvantage, as Mr. Stringer refused to release our 
legal files. In fact, we have still not received all 
documentation from Mr. Stringer; part of the file was 
simply taken by Mr. Schollian who shared office space, but 
not practice with Mr. Stringer, the balance was retrieved 
from Court documents. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT III 
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At this point, due to the length of both the Individual 
and Corporate Defendant's Briefs, and our requirement to 
respond to both, our arguments are becoming duplicative. 
Therefore, we will briefly restate what we have already 
argued in this regard. 
Mr. Stringer, by his own admission in a sworn Affidavit 
(Plf .Orig.Br. Exhibit W) , by the accounts in our sworn 
Affidavits (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibits X,G,H,I), and by the 
history of what has transpired in this case, has failed by 
every legal, professional, ethical and moral standard to 
represent us. Our claims in this case and the reason we 
brought suit are clear; we gave up everything, job 
security, a comfortable home, our savings, friends, 
lifestyle, everything to come to Utah and build this 
restaurant. We refer in part to the quote of Beverly 
Swanson in her letter (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit I, ref. #13 in 
attached Affidavit) to Shane Swanson of December 6, 1995, 
regarding Chris Swanson1s participation in this venture: 
"...He (Chris Swanson) has literally worked miracles to 
get some of the things passed off with the City. He is on 
the phone constantly or going to the engineer and hundreds 
of other projects to get this place done. He quit a 
wonderful job where his Christmas bonus was 2 0 to 3 0 
Thousand each Christmas. Gave up a beautiful condo to 
come here and help with this venture, lives in a tiny 
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apartment with absolutely no privacy, someone is always in 
there having a meeting with the vendors or the workers are 
wanting to use the phone or their money. . . " This is a 
true statement by the very Defendant who has gained total 
ownership of our shares in the venture through this 
miscarriage of justice. Why would we abandon or be less 
than diligent in pursuing this case where we had given up 
so much to create? There can be no doubt that the 
egregious behavior of Mr. Stringer and his lack of 
prosecution on our behalf defines the legal meaning of 
exceptional and extraordinary, and this case is the very 
definition of a "strong likelihood that an injustice has 
occurred." (page 8 of Corp.App.Resp.Br.) Stringer's 
admitted failure to inform us of the Judgments, to reply 
to the Stipulation of Mr. Valentine, failure to default 
the Corporate Defendant when they had not responded to 
Requests for Documents and Interrogatories after almost 
six months, all the time telling us that "everything is on 
track" is positive misconduct. Our actions upon learning 
of his misdeeds were immediate: we fired him, we filed a 
Complaint with the State Bar, he was suspended from the 
practice of law. We attempted to reconstruct the legal 
documents and obtain our legal records and hired new 
counsel- all reasonable and diligent actions. 
Furthermore, part of the reason we did not bring a 
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malpractice suit against Mr. Stringer, as suggested by 
Judge Schofield, in addition to the fact Mr. Stringer was 
declaring bankruptcy, was that the Utah State Bar informed 
us that any complaint would be held in abeyance until any 
pending legal issues were final. We wanted to protect the 
unsuspecting public, who rely upon legal professionals, 
from the likes of Mr. Stringer. Mr. Stringer had taken 
our money, had a security interest in our stock in this 
very Corporation, and his unknown (to us) legal, personal, 
mental, financial, and physical problems totally 
disintegrated the attorney-client relationship and the 
agency was dissolved. These were extraordinary acts of 
delinquency on Stringer's part. In this instance, 
Stringer did abandon his practice as related to our case; 
he only made a weak attempt at remedial action when he 
knew we would find out about the Judgments and his 
deceptions. This was only to save himself, not out of any 
duty of care to us. It is true, we chose him during a 
period of great financial, emotional, and personal 
distress. We relied upon the professional standards of 
review of the legal community and the Utah State Bar (who 
finally suspended him). Now Mr. Valentine and Lowry in 
their Corporate Brief (page 12) claim that they "bent over 
backwards to give Mr. Stringer every opportunity to 
present his defenses". They did not show any interest in 
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giving Chris & Laurie Swanson such "professional 
courtesy" . We are pleased to see that they recognize and 
admit Judge Schofield's "skeptical" (Corp.Br.page 12) 
reaction throughout the Hearing; we prefer to characterize 
it as arbitrary. A clear reading of the September 4, 1997 
Hearing Transcript (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit Y) , starting at 
page 7, shows that the Honorable Judge Schofield was not 
open to our arguments, and had made up his mind before the 
Hearing started. We resent Mr. Valentine's and Mr. Lowry's 
characterization of Chris & Laurie Swanson as "delinquent, 
incredible, and untimely". Furthermore, Mr. Valentine's 
Brief of the Corporate Appellants states that "they do not 
deserve the extraordinary justice" meted to the few 
parties that have received relief from attorney 
misconduct." We do not claim to deserve extraordinary 
justice. if there is in fact any such measure, only 
justice. Justice based upon the true facts of this case 
and the remedies contemplated at law. Furthermore, it is 
not the Defendants' prerogative to define the level of 
justice that we deserve, which is the very reason this 
case is before this Court. (Corp.Br. page 12) 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT IV 
We have addressed the issue of meritorious defense 
previously and will not burden the Court with additional 
dialog on this issue. 
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REPLY TO ARGUMENT V 
Rule 56 (d) U.R.C.P. CASE NOT FULLY ADJUDICATED ON MOTION 
states in pertinent part: "If on motion under this rule, 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all 
the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at 
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall 
if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are 
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear 
without substantial controversy, including the extent to 
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are iust. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. (Emphasis added)." 
Rule 55 (b) U.R.C.P. JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT (2) states: 
" . . .In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment 
by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it 
into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth 
of any averment bv evidence or to make an investigation of 
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or 
order such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
(Emphasis added)." 
In this case, there were two Partial Summary Judgments 
which resulted by default due to Mr. Stringer's failure to 
advise Chris & Laurie Swanson of the proceedings. There 
was never any attempt to put a monetary amount of the 
claimed damages either by the Corporate or Individual 
Defendants. No hearing on damages, no review of the 
pleadings, no review by the Court of the Plaintiffs' 
Response (Plf.Orig.Br. Exhibit N) to the Counterclaim 
filed by the Individual Defendants, no financial records, 
no witnesses or accountants. Only vague accusations that 
the Plaintiffs mav have repaid themselves part of their 
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capital investment, vague claims of varied and 
contradictory amounts missing according to the Defendants. 
No value assigned to the corporate stock, property, or 
loss of business opportunity or any of the other draconian 
sanctions against the Plaintiffs. There is no 
relationship, correlation or proportionality, and not even 
an inquiry or hearing by the Court regarding the sanctions 
imposed upon the Plaintiffs as related to any claimed 
losses of the Defendants. Chris and Laurie Swanson's due 
process rights were violated by this entire action. 
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be 
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place, and circumstances. Rather, "the demands of 
due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of 
procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case 
and just to the parties involved. " Rupp v. Grantsvilie 
City, Utah, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (1980). 
As stated in the record, we never had the opportunity to 
respond to the false allegations made against us, we lost 
our entire investment in a business we gave everything to 
build, we were denied the right to have the case decided 
upon it's merits due to the failings of our disgraced, 
suspended, and now bankrupt former attorney Mark K. 
Stringer. 
Yet according to the theory of the Corporate Defendants on 
page 14 of their Brief: "A party could allege in affidavit 
extraordinary facts to support a motion for summary 
judgment, and, absent rebutting facts that create a 
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dispute, still prevail". If the Court accepts this 
interpretation of the law, the Corporate or Individual 
Defendants could have claimed damages for millions of 
dollars, and based upon the circumstances of this case, 
still prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is a textbook example of justice gone wrong. 
Laypersons have the reasonable expectation that they will 
be allowed their day in court in a trial based upon it' s 
merits, and upon the integrity of the legal system. It is 
logical to rely upon members of the Utah State Bar to 
perform their fiduciary duties and comply with the laws of 
agency, provided their clients offer sensible and diligent 
assistance and cooperation with their attorney. Chris & 
Laurie Swanson have met this standard. Legal 
technicalities, hair splitting, misuse of the rules, 
attorneys who are derelict in their duty, should not 
impede the furtherance of justice. 
Chris & Laurie Swanson have shown a meritorious defense, 
have shown all reasonable and due care in the prosecution 
of their case, and have been timely in acting once they 
discovered the positive and gross misconduct of Mr. 
Stringer. The Summary Judgments that resulted in our 
total loss deserve to be tried upon their merits; they 
were not final, and not appealable at any time prior to 
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the time we timely appealed them. Harmless error and 
mistake by PRO SE Plaintiffs should not be allowed to 
cloud the issues of fairness and justice, especially when 
there is no undue burden to the Defendants. The 
Defendants have had the full control, opportunity, and 
profits from this business; allowing this case to go 
forward will not unduly burden them in any way. We pray 
this Court will hear our Appeal of the Summary Judgments 
in a light most favorable to the losing party and reverse 
all Judge Schofield's Rulings and remand this case for a 
trial upon it's merits. 
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Dated^th^s ^J^^S^ of October, 1998 
iris S&anat>n 
Plaintiff and Appellant PRCkSE 
Swanson 
iff and Appellant PRb SE 
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ADDENDUM 
3 0 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE ) 
SWANSON, ) 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, ; 
vs . 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, ) 
and CLINTON SWANSON, an 
individual, and NIKKI SHUMWAY, 
an individual, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES INC., a Utah 
Business, ' 
Defendants and Appellees. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS': (A) 
MOTION TO STRIKE; AND (B) 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
) Case No. 980285-CA 
Priority 29 (b) (15) 
1 Thomas W. Seiler 
I ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
I 80 North 100 East 
/ P.O. Box 1266 
/ Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
\^ Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
John L. Valentine 
Attorney for Corporate Defendant/Appellee 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, UT 84603 
Chris Swanson and Laurie Swanson 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
823 Palm Drive 
Glendale, CA 91202 
(ex. a - A ) 
COME NOW the Individual Defendants/Appellees (hereinafter the 
"Individual Defendants'') and respectfully request that the Court 
deny the Plaintiffs'/Appellants' (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") Motion 
to Strike and Motion for Partial Summary Disposition. The 
Individual Defendants respond to the "Points" in the Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Strike and Motion for Partial Summary Disposition in the 
order in which they appear. 
POINT I 
The Individual Defendants' Reply Brief incorrectly denotes it 
as "Appellants' Brief, PRO SE." This is an error. This error is 
governed by Rule 27(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(hereinafter "Rule 27(d)"). That Rule states, in pertinent part: 
(d) Effect of non-compliance of rules. The clerk shall 
examine all briefs before filing. If they are not 
prepared in accordance with these rules, they will not 
be filed but shall be returned to be properly prepared. 
The clerk shall retain one copy of the non-complying 
brief and the party shall file a brief prepared in 
compliance with these rules within 5 days. The party 
whose brief has been rejected under this provision shall 
immediately notify the opposing party in writing of the 
lodging. The clerk may grant additional time for 
bringing a brief into compliance only under extraordinary 
circumstances. This rule is not intended to permit 
significant substantive changes in briefs. 
After mailing the brief, and before it was received by the 
Utah Court of Appeals, the Undersigned (Individual Defendants' 
counsel) telephonically inquired of the Utah Court of Appeals 
clerking staff how to address the problem of the error referred to 
herein. The clerking staff assured the Undersigned that it would 
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not be a problem but that if it became a problem the Undersigned 
would be contacted to make the correction. In the meantime, it is 
the Undersigned's understanding that the Utah Court of Appeals 
clerking staff has corrected this problem by interlineation. 
The error in the Individual Defendants' Brief designation is 
not fatal. 
"Despite violations of appellate brief rules governing 
the format and content of briefs, ^ courts may reach the 
merits of the case in the interest of justice or simply 
as a matter of discretion. Courts may also review for 
plain error when there are violations of appellate rules. 
Courts are least likely to dismiss an appeal or impose 
other sanctions when briefing errors do not hamper the 
ability to dispose of the appeal or otherwise interfere 
with their review. Courts prefer to dispose of a case 
on the merits rather than to dismiss for deficiencies in 
a brief....Courts generally will not dismiss an appeal 
or impose sanctions when the defects do not prejudice the 
other party. Sometimes courts require that an amended 
brief be filed to comply with appellate rules'' (5 Am Jur 
2d Appellate Review Sections 578, Page 281 (footnotes 
deleted)). 
The Plaintiffs understood that it was the Individual 
Defendants' Brief. That is clear from the Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Strike and Motion for Partial Summary Disposition, PRO SE, when 
they note, on the second (but unnumbered) page thereof that the 
Plaintiffs "received the enclosed nine (9) page brief from 
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC, attorney for the Individual 
Defendants, signed by Thomas W. Seiler, (Exhibit 1) ." 
POINT II 
As is set forth in the brief filed by the Individual 
Defendants and submitted on September 22, 1998, to the Utah Court 
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of Appeals, the Appellants do not brief the matter appealed. The 
Notice of Appeal filed by the Plaintiffs claims an appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court of the final order and judgment of the Honorable 
Anthony Schofield entered on November 10, 1997. The three things 
which are briefed according to the "Appellants' Statement of 
Jurisdiction" are: (a) the Partial Summary Judgment entered 
December 10, 1996; (b) the Judgment entered on or about May 13, 
1997; and, (c) a Ruling entered on November 10, 1997. None of 
those three matters, which are designated in the Appellants' Brief 
as the matters they are appealing, are the final order and judgment 
of the Honorable Anthony Schofield entered November 10, 1997, as 
is set forth in the Notice of Appeal. Indeed, the Ruling entered 
by the Honorable Anthony Schofield, Fourth Judicial District Court 
Judge, on October 10, 1997, is not appealable. It does not purport 
to be a final judgment. 
POINT III 
The mailing certificate on the Corporate Defendants/Appellees' 
Brief certifies that it was served by mailing a copy of the same, 
postage prepaid, to all parties on September 23, 1998. In its 
final form it was received by counsel for the Individual Defendants 
on September 24, 1998. 
CONCLUSION 
The paragraph entitled "Motion to Strike" and the paragraph 
entitled "Motion for Partial Summary Disposition" found in the 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike and Motion for Partial Summary 
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Disposition, PRO SE, on unnumbered pages 3 and 4, respectively, are 
both based upon the Plaintiffs' theory that the error made in 
designating the brief submitted by the Individual Defendants in 
designating their brief "Appellants' Brief, PRO SE" is fatal. Rule 
27(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure make it clear it is 
not fatal. Rather, if the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
determines that a brief is "not prepared in accordance with these 
[appellate] rules" the clerk retains a copy, returns the balance 
of the copies of the briefs and notifies the offending party of the 
non-compliance, granting five days to respond to the same. That 
has not been done in this case. Indeed, counsel for the Individual 
Defendants contacted the office of the clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals on September 23, 1998, after the brief had been mailed and 
before it was received by the Utah Court of Appeals, and explained 
the error to the clerk's office. The staff at the clerk's office 
indicated that there was no need to file an amended brief in the 
absence of notification by the clerk's office to the contrary. The 
Individual Defendants have relied upon that advice. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the Utah Courts 
of Appeals should deny the Plaintiffs' "Motion to Strike, Motion 
for Partial Summary Disposition, PRO SE". 
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DATED this 13th day of October, 1998. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LP 
/(/jn4£*o U 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing, with postage prepaid, this / —> day of October, 
1998, to the following: 
John Valentine 
P.O. Box 778 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, UT 84603 
Chris Swanson 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
823 Palm Drive 
Glendale, CA 91202 
Laurie Swanson 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
823 Palm Drive 
Glendale, CA 9120 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
G:\SEILER\SWANSON\SWANSON2.BRI 
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Thomas W.Seiler, #2910 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo,UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ) 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON ] 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY ; 
individually; and BEVERLY ; 
SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON ; 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba ; 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and ; 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC., ; 
a Utah business, ] 
Defendants. ' 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) DISPOSITION 
) Case No. 970578 
) 960400307 
COME NOW the individual Defendants, and respectfully request that the Court 
grant their motion for Summary Disposition and affirm the order appealed from, as it applies 
to the individual Defendants, on the basis that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not 
to merit further proceedings and consideration by this court. Utah R. App. Proc, R. 10(a)(2). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about December 6, 1996, the District Court entered a Partial 
(ex. <P-B) 
Summary Judgment in favor of the individual Defendants and against the individual Plaintiffs. 
(See copy attached as Ex. 'A'.) 
2. On or about May 12,1997, the District Court entered a Partial Summary 
Judgment in favor of the corporate Defendant and against the individual Plaintiffs. (See copy 
attached as Ex. 'B'.) 
3. On or about October 10, 1997, the District Court, by and through the 
Honorable Judge Anthony Schofield, denied plaintiffs' motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) for relief from the aforementioned judgments and the Court 
granted defendants' motion to certify the aforementioned judgments as final pursuant to URCP 
Rule 54. (See copy attached as Ex. 'C'.) 
4. On or about November 25,1997, Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, filed 
a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court as to the aforementioned final order and 
judgment entered by Judge Schofield. (See file.) 
5. On or about January 27,1998, Plaintiffs submitted a docketing statement 
to the Utah Supreme Court. The docketing statement indicates that the appeal is from the 
"Summary Judgment [sic] of May 10, 1997[,] in favor of corporate defendant, and Ruling of 
October 10, 1997[,] to uphold said Summary Judgment [sic]." Docketing Statement, ^|1. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure the individual Defendants 
make this Motion for Summary Disposition and request that the Court affirm the order that is 
appealed from on the basis that the grounds for review are too insubstantial to merit further 
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consideration by this Court. 
Plaintiffs contend in their docketing statement, in part, that Judge Schofield abused his 
discretion in denying their motion for relief from a partial summary judgment for the individual 
Defendants that was granted in December of 1996. Plaintiffs base their appeal on a belief that 
Judge Schofield failed to recognize that the neglect was that of their attorney and not of the 
Plaintiffs. See Docketing Statement, ^ 7. 
Judge Schofield was bound by both procedural and substantive Utah law to deny 
Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiffs made an attempt to bring their Rule 60(b) motion under 
Rule 60(b)(7) in hopes of avoiding the reasonable timing requirements for bringing the motion 
pursuant to subsections (1), (2), (3) or (4). Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 60(b) (requires that a party 
make the motion within a reasonable time and, with items (1) through (4), the motion must be 
made within 3 months after the entry of judgment). 
The nature of Plaintiffs' allegations in their Rule 60(b) motion as well as in their appeal 
are that their counsel was negligent in his administration of their case. A rule 60(b) motion for 
relief of judgment on the ground of excusable neglect or inadvertence of counsel is properly 
brought under subsection (b)(1) and must be denied if made more than three months after 
judgment is entered. Peck v. Cook, 510 P.2d 530 (Utah 1973) (case in which the Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court to set aside an order that had erroneously granted 
relief from judgment for excusable neglect of counsel brought after the three month time 
limitation):Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties. 838 P.2d 672, 674 
(Utah App. 1992) (specifically discusses the negligence of an attorney within subsections (1) 
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or (7) and concludes that subsection (1) is to be applied).1 
Judge Schofield did not conclude, as is alleged in Plaintiffs' Docketing Statement, that 
"the neglect was inexcusable and not a result of the actions of the Plaintiffs [sic] attorney, but 
that the Plaintiffs were responsible." Docketing Statement, | 7. The District Court's decision 
was simply required by the constraints of Rule 60(b) without regard to whether the Plaintiffs 
or their attorney was to blame. The Rule 60(b) constraints require the motion for relief to be 
made within three months when the grounds for the motion are of the nature alleged by 
Plaintiffs in this case-neglect of counsel. Plaintiffs' motion asserted the negligence of counsel 
as the basis for relief, and their motion was not made within three months, therefore, it was 
properly denied. 
It is clear that there are no grounds that would justify review of the trial courts decision 
as it applies to the individual defendants in this case. 
In addition, the Docketing Statement specifically states that the Plaintiffs are appealing 
the "Summary Judgment... in favor of Corporate Defendant,.. . ." Docketing Statement, If 
1. The individual Defendants appear to not be within the scope of the Plaintiffs' appeal. 
However, to the extent that the Plaintiffs' statement is technically deficient, but excusable, the 
individual Defendants rely on the foregoing basis for granting their Motion for summary 
disposition. 
The individual Defendants also point out to the Court that service of the Notice of 
1
 Judge Schofield correctly noted that subsection (7) of Rule 60(b) may not be applied when the grounds 
for relief are encompassed within subsection (1). See Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Co. 838 P.2d at 674. 
4 
\o 
Appeal of November 25, 1997, was not made on the Corporate Defendant nor its counsel of 
record in the District Court proceedings. 
Tv-
DATED this f ^dav of February, 1998. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC
 y l 
lomas W. Seiler 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a correct copy of the foregoing was mailed this 7 day 
of February, 1998, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Chris & Laurie Swanson 
1025 North Louise Street 
Glendale, CA 91207 
John L. Valentine 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Chris Swanson and Laurie 
Swanson, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
Beverly Swanson, an 
individual, and Clinton 
Swanson, an individual, and 
Nikki Shumway, all dba 
Swanson Enterprises, and 
Swanson Enterprises, Inc, a 
Utah Business, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUN 1 9 1998 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
SUA SPONTE MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 980285-CA 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
A docketing statement has been filed with the Court of 
Appeals in the above-captioned case. This case is being 
considered for summary dismissal, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 10(e) , on the grounds that the notice of 
appeal was not filed within thirty days of entry of the order 
being appealed. In lieu of a brief, both parties shall file a 
memorandum, not to exceed ten pages, explaining why summary 
disposition should, or should not, be granted by the court. 
Failure to file a memorandum may result in granting of the 
motion. 
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be 
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before 
July 3, 1998. , 
DATED this jl day of June, 1998. 
jSdith M. Billings, Judge 
% 
**>. 
fex. z-c) 
MEMORANDUM 
PRO SE 
Chris & Laurie Swanson 
823 Palm Drive 
Glendale, CA 91202 
(818) 247-2135 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs, 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, and 
CLINTON SWANSON, an individual, and 
NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah Business, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
SUA SPONTE SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 980285-CA 
ON SEPTEMBER 4, 1997, A HEARING ON A MOTION BY THE PLAINTIFFS TO SET ASIDE TWO 
PREVIOUS SUMMARY JUDGEMENTS IN THE ABOVE CASE WAS HELD BEFORE JUDGE ANTHONY 
SCHOFIELD IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY. THE PLAINTIFFS WERE 
REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY JERRY SCHOLLIAN. 
JUDGE SCHOFIELD RULED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE. AS A 
RESULT OF THIS AND THE PREVIOUS DECISIONS BY JUDGE SCHOFIELD, THE PLAINTIFFS 
LOST THEIR ENTIRE INVESTMENT IN A VALUABLE AND POTENTIALLY PROFITABLE 
BUSINESS. IN ADDITION, THE PLAINTIFFS LOST THEIR HOME, THEIR JOBS, THEIR 
SAVINGS AND SUBSTANTIAL TIME, EFFORT, AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
BUILD THE BUSINESS IN QUESTION. 
HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE SET FORTH IN THE HEARING WAS CLEAR AND UNCONTESTED: THE 
PLAINTIFF'S PREVIOUS ATTORNEY, MARK STRINGER, ADMITTED IN A SWORN DEPOSITION 
THAT: 
1. "I WAS UNAWARE OF THE MOTION AND ORDER FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
UNTIL LATE IN MAY, 19 97." 
( € x . 2 -
"AT THE TIME OF THE MOTION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THIS 
MATTER, I WAS STILL UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT I HAD AN EXTENSION 
TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY, AND TO FURTHER RESPOND TO OTHER PENDING 
MATTERS." 
"I NEVER NOTIFIED MY CLIENTS, AS THE MATTER WAS NOT DISCOVERED 
UNTIL, LATE, AND THE COMMUNICATION FROM THE OFFICE TO CLIENTS WAS 
LIMITED TO KNOWN IMMEDIATE AND EMERGENCY MATTERS, AND THE RESPONSE 
TO THE ORDER DID NOT REQUIRE THEIR DIRECT PARTICIPATION." 
"MY CLIENTS HAVE PROVIDED THE RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY, AND THEY CAN 
BE READY TO SERVE ON COUNSEL WITHIN A WEEK OF HAVING NOTICE TO DO 
SO. " 
"UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT DISSERVICE AND 
INJUSTICE TO THE PLAINTIFFS TO HAVE THEIR CASE DISMISSED DUE TO 
THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO MY OWN NEGLECT AND INADVERTENCE." 
IN ADDITION, THE PLAINTIFFS SUBMITTED SWORN AFFIDAVITS WHICH 
STATED, IN PART: 
"MR. STRINGER NEVER INFORMED US OF THE MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGEMENT ..." 
"WE HAVE NEVER HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE ALLEGATIONS 
SET FORTH IN THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT..." 
"WE WERE NEVER PROVIDED WITH COPIES OF MOST OF THE DOCUMENTATION 
OR FILINGS OF MR. STRINGER, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUALLY REQUESTED 
STATUS REPORTS AND ACTION ON THIS MATTER." 
"WE HAVE BEEN DILIGENT IN FOLLOWING UP WITH MARK STINGER AND HIS 
OFFICE BY PHONE, AND FAX." 
"WE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY MARK STRINGER AND HIS OFFICE THAT ALL 
NECESSARY EXTENSIONS TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY HAD BEEN GRANTED AND 
NO ADVERSE ACTIONS HAD OCCURRED . . . " 
WE, THE PLAINTIFFS, BELIEVE THAT THE HONORABLE JUDGE SCHOFIELD MISUSED HIS 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THAT THE FACTS AS OUTLINED IN THE HEARING CLEARLY 
WARRANTED A REVERSAL OF THE PRIOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE 
CASE LAW CITED WAS NOT SIMILAR TO THE SITUATION AT HAND, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING THIS MATTER ARE UNPRECEDENTED: AN ATTORNEY STATES IN A SWORN 
DEPOSITION THAT HE DID NOT ADVISE HIS CLIENTS OF JUDGEMENTS AND RULINGS THAT 
CAUSED THEM TREMENDOUS FINANCIAL, EMOTIONAL, AND LEGAL JEOPARDY. THE 
PLAINTIFFS CONFIRM THIS IN SWORN AFFIDAVITS. YET THE JUDGE RULES THAT THE 
NEGLECT ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFFS WAS INEXCUSABLE. 
AS A RESULT OF HIS ACTIONS IN THIS AND OTHER MATTERS, ATTORNEY STRINGER HAS 
BEEN SUSPENDED BY THE UTAH STATE BAR, PENDING DISBARMENT, AND HAS ALSO FILED 
AND BEEN GRANTED CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY. 
IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE FACTS, THE PLAINTIFFS CHOSE TO APPEAL THE DECISION OF 
JUDGE SCHOFIELD. WE, THE PLAINTIFFS, ADVISED ATTORNEY SCHOLLIAN TO 
IMMEDIATELY APPEAL THE DECISION. ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 25, 1997, AN APPEAL WAS 
FILED BY ATTORNEY SCHOLLIAN IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
ONCE AGAIN, WE RELIED UPON OUR ATTORNEY, MR. SCHOLLIAN, TO FILE THE CLAIM IN 
THE APPROPRIATE COURT AND MANNER. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ACCEPTED OUR APPEAL. 
DUE TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND OUR UNFORTUNATE EXPERIENCES WITH MEMBERS 
* 
OF THE BAR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN GENERAL, WE CHOSE TO PURSUE THIS MATTER ON 
A "PRO SE" BASIS. DOCKETING STATEMENTS, MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, 
RESPONSES TO MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION AND RESPONSES TO MOTIONS FOR 
CONSIDERATION, AND MANY OTHER PLEADINGS WERE FILED AND REVIEWED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT OF UTAH FOR A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF SIX MONTHS. AFTER MORE THAN SIX 
MONTHS, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH DETERMINED TO "POUR OVER" THIS 
CASE TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. 
ON JUNE 19, 1998, THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FILED A SUA SPONTE MOTION TO 
SUMMARILY DEPOSE OF THIS CASE BASED UPON THE GROUNDS THAT THE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
WAS NOT FILED WITH THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF ENTRY OF 
THE ORDER BEING APPEALED. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE UNSURE IF THEIR SECOND ATTORNEY, 
JERRY SCHOLLIAN, WAS NEGLIGENT IN FILING THE ORIGINAL APPEAL WITH THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, RATHER THAN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OR IF THERE 
IS ANOTHER REASON FOR THIS SUA SPONTE MOTION. 
HOWEVER, WE ASK THAT THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS TAKE NOTE OF THE FOLLOWING: 
1. THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH ACCEPTED THIS CASE. 
2. THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION. 
3. THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH "POURED OVER" THIS CASE TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS. 
4. THE PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT THE UTAH STATE BAR, THE COURTS, AND 
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY HAVE THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC 
FROM INEPT, UNSCRUPULOUS, AND UNETHICAL ATTORNEYS. 
5. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE THAT THIS CASE BE ALLOWED TO GO 
FORWARD UPON IT'S MERITS AND THIS CASE SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT FOR A TRIAL BY JURY. 
6. IT WOULD BE A GROSS MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE TO HAVE THIS CASE 
DETERMINED BY THE FAILINGS OF DISGRACED AND INCOMPETENT ATTORNEYS. 
THE PLAINTIFFS ASK THAT THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ALLOW THIS CASE TO GO 
FORWARD AND HEAR OUR APPEAL AND BRIEF. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUFFERED GREAT 
HARM WHILE THE DEFENDANTS ARE AFFORDED AN UNJUST VICTORY DUE SOLELY TO THE 
FAILINGS OF INEPT AND UNSCRUPULOUS MEMBERS OF THE STATE BAR. 
WE, THE PLAINTIFFS, BELIEVED THAT IT WAS REASONABLE TO RELY UPON THE ADVISE 
AND KNOWLEDGE OF OUR ATTORNEYS, WHO WERE IN GOOD STANDING AND MEMBERS OF THE 
UTAH STATE BAR. 
WE BELIEVE THAT THE ENTIRE JUSTICE SYSTEM HAS FAILED TO OFFER US ANY FAIR, 
EQUITABLE, REASONABLE OR COMMON SENSE RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER. AS WE HAVE 
BEEN FORCED TO PURSUE THIS ISSUE ON A PRO SE BASIS, WE ASK THE COURT TO USE 
IT'S DISCRETION TO ALLOW JUSTICE TO BE SERVED IN THIS CASE. THIS CASE 
DESERVES TO BE SETTLED ON IT'S MERITS, NOT LEGAL TECHNICALITIES. THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY REFUSED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SETTLE THIS CASE 
SUMMARILY. THE CASE LAW IS REPLETE WITH PRECEDENCE THAT CASES SHOULD BE 
DECIDED UPON THEIR MERITS. ANY FAILINGS WERE THE RESULT OF ERRORS ON THE PART 
OF OUR ATTORNEYS, WHO HAD A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. 
THE LAW SHOULD PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE CITIZENS, NOT THE ATTORNEYS; THIS 
COURT HAS THE OPPORTUNITY AND OBLIGATION TO SEE THAT JUSTICE IS SERVED. 
CONCLUSION: 
WE SUBMIT THAT THE REASON THAT THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED SUMMARILY FOR 
NOT BEING SUBMITTED IN A TIMELY MANNER TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IS THAT 
THE CASE WAS PENDING AND ACCEPTED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH BASED UPON 
THE ACTIONS OF OUR ATTORNEY, JERRY SCHOLLIAN. 
WE CONTEND THAT IT WAS REASONABLE TO RELY UPON MR. SCHOLLIAN'S ACTIONS AS HE 
WAS A MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING OF THE UTAH STATE BAR. 
WE SUBMIT THAT THIS CASE IS NOT FRIVOLOUS, AND IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF 
JUSTICE THAT WE BE ALLOWED TO PROCEED WITH OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE JUSTICE IN 
THIS MATTER. 
WE PRAY THE COURT TO ALLOW US TO SUBMIT OUR BRIEF AND HEAR OUR ARGUMENTS. WE 
BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BEST SERVE THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE COURTS, AND 
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^ZJDAY OF JULY, 1998: 
M/>-— 
Chris Swanson 
e Swanson 
\% 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this £*<* day of July, 1998: 
John L. Valentine 
c/o Howard, Lewis & Peterson 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Thomas W. Seiler 
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
prie Swanson 
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JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 23,628 
Attorneys for Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
*THE <'(H .PP. 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, 
CLINTON SWANSON, an individual, and 
NIKKI SHUMWAY, an individual, all 
dba SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah business, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Case No. 980285-CA 
The Court has filed a sua sponte motion for summary disposition in this matter. The 
'Zo (£*. J -e) 
motion should be granted. 
DATED this 6th day of July, 1998. 
JOHN L. VALENTINE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this (0 day of July, 1998. 
Thomas W. Seiler, Esq. 
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Chris and Laurie Swanson 
823 Palm Drive 
Glendale, CA 91202 
J:\HHA\SWANSUA.WP 
2 
COPY 
Thomas W.Seiler, #2910 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Attorneys for Beverly Swanson and Clinton Swanson 
80 North 100 East 
PO Box 1266 
Provo, Utah 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, 
CLINTON SWANSON, an individual, 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, an individual, 
all dba SWANSON ENTERPRISES; 
and SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC., 
a Utah business, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Civil No. 980285-CA 
ms filed a sua sponte motion for summary disposition in this matter. 
The motion should be granted. 
Z.-2. 
0 € x . o> 
-F) 
DATED this _ 2 day of July, 1998. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC , 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorneys for Beverly Swanson 
and Clinton Swanson 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^j__ day of July, 1998,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Chris and Laurie Swanson 
823 Palm Drive 
Glendale, California 91202 
John L. Valentine 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
^•Utt'Sl&H 
FOURTH 
OFUX 
FILED 
I3TRICT COURT 
OF UTAH 
JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
UtHj"P/ 
J:\jlv\swanson.cer 
Our File No. 23.628 
Attorneys for Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
HE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, an individual, 
and CLINTON SWANSON, an 
individual, and NIKKI SHUMWAY, an 
individual; and BEVERLY SWANSON 
CLINTON SWANSON and NIKKI 
SWANSON, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY OF/ 
DISCOVERY 
Case No. 960400307CN 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
The undersigned hereby certifies that: i inr*.''.'?_ _ day of Ac 
copies of Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc.'s Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests 
I I 11 
.inJ ii -i » i f this certificate t< > be mailed to Mark I ;, Stringer, Blakelock & 
Stringer, Attorneys for Plaintiffs at 37 East Center, 2nd Floor, Provo, UT 84606 and Thomas 
& «0 
W. Seiler, Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, 80 North 100 East, P.O. Box 1266, Provo, UT 84603-
1266, with sufficient postage prepaid. 
DATED this ^ day of August, 1996. 
VALENTINE, for: 
ID, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant Swanson Enterprises 
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Thomas W.Seiler, #2910 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY 
individually; and BEVERLY 
SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC., 
a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960400307CN 
Judge: 
COME NOW the Defendants Beverly Swanson, Clinton Swanson, and Nikki 
Shumway, and move the Court for summary judgment determining that the Plaintiffs have no 
interest in and to that certain real property described on Exhibit "J" to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
as apparently alleged in Count 2 and Count 9 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint. This Motion is 
supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Affidavit of 
(e%. 2. - H) 
Beverly Swanson submitted simultaneously herewith. The basis for this Motion is, in general 
terms, that there has been no delivery, nor was there any delivery contemplated, of the deed 
which is attached to the Plaintiffs' Complaint as Exhibit "J" and to this Motion as Exhibit "A". 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1996. 
ROBINSOT^ SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
/ 
v^ /,^Jr) & Cj&te* 
Thomas W. Seiler 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a correct copy of the foregoing was mailed this £ " day 
of July, 1996, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Mark K. Stringer 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 
Second Floor, Front 
Provo, UT 84606 
John L. Valentine 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
U:
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Mail Tax Notice to. f~~ 
v 
- A / 
Grantee: y£fa~ A^-f^\ 
Beverly Swanson ' 
3707 E. Littlerock Drive 
Provo, UT 84604 
WARRANTY DEED 
BEVERLY G. SWANSON, a married woman, Grantor 
of Provo, Utah County, State of Utah, 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to Grantees 
BEVERLY G. SWANSON and CHRIS SWANSON, Mother and Son, 4S JOINT TENANTS, AND NOT AS 
TENANTS IN COMMON, WITH FULL RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP TO EITHER 
of 3707 EAST LITTLEROCK DRIVE. PROVO, UT, 84604 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATIONS 
the following descnbed tract of land in UTAH County, State of UTAH: 
Commencing 22.44 feet East and 811.14 feet North 35°22 ' 
West along Easterly Line of State Highway from the South 
East Comer of Section 26, Township 6 South, Range 2 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 35°22' 
West 86 feet along Easterly Line of Highway; thence North 
34° East 76 feet; thence South 35°22' East 86 feet to 
center line of West Union Canal; thence South 34° West 76 
feet along the Canal to the place of beginning. 
19:24:18 
TOGETHER with all improvements and appurtenances thereunto beloncmg. "~~ 
SUBJECT TO Easements, Rights of Way, Restrictions and Reservations appearing of record. (J^  jjfY^^0 - , ' 
SUBJECT TO THE TERMS & CONDITIONS OF THAT CERTAIN TRUST DEED DATED Z . iJtJ ' ' 
APRIL 17,1987, BY AND BETWEEN RAY LEROY CHRISTEN AND MAURINE CHRISTEN, JJU'
 A
 A
 ' -y'l 
AS TRUSTORS, TO WASATCH BANK, AS TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY, RECORDED
 /7[ MS ^ ' ~ *,r£ 
APRIL 27, 1987, ENTRY #16071, BOOK 2408, PAGE 728, RECORDS OF UTAH " , , X -*'~ " 
COUNTY.UTAH, GIVEN TO SECURE THE PAYMENT OF A TRUST DEED NOTE WHICH . > "f- " ~ /lH*'~ 
HAS AN UNPAID PRINCIPAL BALANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF $12,783.29. ^ * , J*** 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor, th is day of A.D. 1995. 6l 5 " £ : 
-Jt\Jksh^^ 
G. SWANSON 
Grantc ' 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of , 1995, personally 
appeared before me BEVERLY SWANSON the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
Thomas W. Seiler, #2910 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
80 North 100 West 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
(?) 
ftfv)* 
AT 
Woi 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON un.l LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY 
individually; and BEVERLY 
SWANSON, CLINTON SWANSON 
and NIKKI SHUMWAY, all dba 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES; and 
SWANSON ENTERPRISES, INC., 
a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF 
HAND DELIVERY 
Civil No. 960400307CN 
Judge: Stevr H:;<".sen 
COMES NOW t! Iersigned Ardis E. Parshall, secretary for Thomas W. 
Seiler of Robinson, Seiler & Glazier, LC, counsel for the Defendants Beverly Swanson, 
Clinton Swanson, and Nikki Shumway, and certifies that on November 6, 1996, she hand 
(G*.2-X} 
delivered the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Affidavit 
of Beverly Swanson to Mark K. Stringer, Blakelock & Stringer, 37 East Center, Second 
Floor, Front, Provo, UT 84606, and to John L. Valentine, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, 120 
East 300 North, Provo, UT 84606. 
DATED this J ^ day of November, 1996. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
Ardis E. Parshall 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that correct copies of the foregoing were hand delivered this 
Friday of November, 1996, addressed as follows: 
Mark K. Stringer 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 
Second Floor, Front 
Provo, UT 84606 
John L. Valentine 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, UT 84603 
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JOHN L, VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
* * *
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OurffiRlfty23,628 
Attorneys for Swanson Enterprises, Inc. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS SWANSON and LAURIE 
SWANSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BEVERLY SWANSON, CLINTON 
SWANSON, NIKKI SHUMWAY, 
individuaUy; and BEVERLY SWANSON, 
CLINTON SWANSON and NIKKI 
SHUMWAY, all dba SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES; and SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah business, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT SWANSON 
ENTERPRISES, INC.'S, MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 960400307CN 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Defendant Swanson Enterprises, Inc., moves this court for a judgment in its favor on 
each count of the Plaintiffs* Complaint. 
33 (ex. 2-3) 
DATED this 
_2f, day of February, 1997. 
JOHN U. VALENTINE, for. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant Swanson 
Enterprises, Inc. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage picpouJ, Una l(r^ day of February, 1997. 
Mark K. Stringer, Esq. 
Blakelock & Stringer 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 
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